Summary
Zerologon comes from the Netlogon protocol used by Windows domain controllers, where AES-CFB8 encryption is applied with an initialisation vector fixed at zero. That mistake lets an attacker pass authentication without knowing the key, purely through statistics.
After a few hundred attempts on average, the attacker can set the domain controller's machine account password to an empty value — which means domain administrator access and the ability to dump every password hash in the directory.
Advisory details
Root cause: zero IV meets zero plaintext
The ComputeNetlogonCredential function uses AES-CFB8 with a constant zero IV. When the attacker submits an all-zero plaintext, the probability that the output is also all zeros is roughly 1 in 256 per attempt.
This is a textbook case where the cryptography itself is sound but the way it is used is not. A few hundred attempts complete in seconds.
Non-destructive verification
Exposure is tested by attempting only the authentication step, without resetting the machine account password. Tools that perform the reset can take a production domain offline.
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/ad$ python3 zerologon_tester.py DC01 10.10.20.10 Performing authentication attempts... ============================= Success! DC can be fully compromised by a Zerologon attack. # the test only attempted authentication; NO password was changed
Figure 1 — A checker that does not reset the password
Careful
The weaponised Zerologon exploit resets the domain controller's machine account password and breaks the secure channel. In production, use the non-destructive check only; full exploitation belongs in a Red Team engagement with an agreed rollback plan.
Event log hunting
Both exploitation and legacy clients using insecure connections leave events 5827-5829 on the domain controller. Exported logs can be scanned in seconds.
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/ad$ grep -oE '<EventID>(5827|5828|5829)</EventID>' dc01-system.xml | sort | uniq -c 34 <EventID>5827</EventID> 6 <EventID>5829</EventID> # 5827: insecure netlogon connection denied # 5829: would be denied once enforcement mode is on (warning)
Figure 2 — Counting Netlogon events in domain controller logs
Remediation: enforcement mode
The fix ships in two stages: first the secure channel requirement runs in warning mode, then enforcement is enabled. Event 5829 lists the legacy clients that will lose connectivity when you enforce — fix those first.
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/ad$ python3 zerologon_tester.py DC01 10.10.20.10 Performing authentication attempts... ===================================================== Attack failed. Target is probably patched. # enforcement mode active, insecure netlogon rejected
Figure 3 — The same check failing after enforcement is enabled
- Apply the relevant updates to every domain controller and switch on enforcement mode.
- Fix or formally exception the legacy clients (NAS boxes, printers, old Samba) that appear in event 5829.
- If you find a domain controller whose machine account password was reset, treat it as a breach: credential rotation including krbtgt is required.
Conclusion
Zerologon shows how one protocol detail can bring down an entire identity estate. The practical takeaway is to treat domain controllers as their own asset class and to measure their patch window in hours rather than days.
Sources
Test it in your own environment
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