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Home / Blog / CVE-2024-6387
Vulnerability Analysis

regreSSHion: A Race Condition Returns to OpenSSH

Summary

CVE-2024-6387 lives in the SIGALRM handler that OpenSSH uses to enforce its authentication timeout. The handler calls functions that are not safe to use in a signal context; with the right timing that corrupts memory structures and can lead to code execution as root.

The bug was originally fixed in 2006 and reintroduced by a 2020 code change — hence the “regression” in its name. Exploitation is slow and difficult (hours under lab conditions), but given how many SSH servers face the internet, the scale of exposure is enormous.

Advisory details

CVECVE-2024-6387 (regreSSHion)
ComponentOpenSSH server (sshd) — SIGALRM handler
ClassCWE-364 · Signal handler race condition
SeverityHIGH · CVSS 8.1
Affected versions8.5p1 – 9.7p1 (and before 4.4p1) on glibc-based Linux
PrerequisiteNetwork access to sshd — no credentials required

Root cause: an unsafe call in signal context

If a client does not finish authentication within LoginGraceTime, sshd raises SIGALRM to tear the connection down. When the handler calls functions that are not async-signal-safe, it can corrupt data structures another code path left half-written.

An attacker who disconnects at exactly the timeout boundary can retry that condition again and again; the odds are low per attempt but the attempts are trivially automated.

Exposure check

analyst@ubuntu: ~ –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:~$ ssh -V 2>&1 && dpkg -l openssh-server | tail -n 1
OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.4, OpenSSL 3.0.13
ii  openssh-server  1:9.6p1-3ubuntu13.4  amd64

#  within 8.5p1 - 9.7p1 — affected range

Figure 1 — Identifying the installed OpenSSH version

The second check is the timeout setting. The default of 120 seconds gives an attacker a comfortable race window.

analyst@ubuntu: ~ –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:~$ sudo sshd -T | grep -E 'logingracetime|permitrootlogin|maxstartups'
logingracetime 120
permitrootlogin prohibit-password
maxstartups 10:30:100

#  default value — mitigation suggests 0 or a much lower setting

Figure 2 — Reading the effective configuration

Remediation

The primary fix is a package update. If that has to wait, LoginGraceTime 0 closes the race window — but it raises the risk of connection-exhaustion denial of service, so it should be paired with a sensible MaxStartups.

analyst@ubuntu: ~ –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:~$ sudo apt install --only-upgrade openssh-server && sudo systemctl restart ssh && ssh -V
Setting up openssh-server (1:9.6p1-3ubuntu13.5) ...
OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.5, OpenSSL 3.0.13

#  distribution patch applied (the package revision moves, not the upstream version)

Figure 3 — Applying and verifying the distribution patch

Do not trust the version number alone

Distributions backport the fix without changing the upstream version string. Verify through the package revision in ssh -V or through apt changelog.

Log hunting

Exploitation attempts generate a large number of connections that close before authentication completes. Heavy “Timeout before authentication” logging from a single source is a strong indicator.

analyst@ubuntu: /var/log –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:/var/log$ grep -c 'Timeout before authentication' auth.log && grep -oE 'Timeout before authentication for [0-9.]+' auth.log | awk '{print $NF}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -n 3
8341
   8102 193.142.1xx.57
    214 45.61.1xx.8
     12 10.0.0.31

#  8102 half-finished sessions from a single IP — automated attempts

Figure 4 — Distribution of incomplete authentication attempts

Conclusion

regreSSHion reminded the industry that old fixes can come back undone, and that even the most trusted service is not exempt. The practical conclusion: putting SSH behind a bastion or zero-trust access layer is a far more durable defence than winning every patch race.

Sources

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