Summary
MOVEit Transfer is a managed file transfer (MFT) product organisations use to exchange files with partners. CVE-2023-34362 is an unauthenticated SQL injection in its web interface.
The injection was chained into the product's own object loading path to drop a web shell named human2.aspx on the server. That chain became the foundation of a 2023 extortion campaign that stole data from hundreds of organisations.
Method note
No exploitation payload is published here; the focus is exposure detection, artefact hunting and remediation.
Advisory details
Root cause: trusted input and a powerful database account
The first link in the chain is user input reaching a SQL statement unsanitised. The second is the breadth of the database account's privileges, combined with the application processing data read back from the database without sufficient validation.
Together they turn what should have been a read-only injection into the ability to write files on the server.
Exposure and version check
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/mft$ curl -sk https://mft.lab.local/human.aspx | grep -oiE 'MOVEit (Transfer|DMZ)[^<]{0,20}' MOVEit Transfer 2023.0.0 # a build from before May 2023 — affected range
Figure 1 — Reading the product version from the login page
For internet-facing MFT servers the second question is whether the admin interface and API endpoints need to be exposed at all.
Artefact hunting
The campaign's clearest trace is the human2.aspx file dropped into the web root, together with temporary DLLs.
analyst@ubuntu:/mnt/moveit$ find wwwroot -maxdepth 1 -newermt '2023-05-25' -printf '%TY-%Tm-%Td %10s %p\n' | sort 2023-05-28 3421 wwwroot/human2.aspx 2023-05-28 11776 wwwroot/App_Data/_tmp7f3a.dll 2023-05-31 97344 wwwroot/human.aspx # human2.aspx = the known web shell artefact
Figure 2 — Searching the web root for unexpected files
IIS logs reveal the order of the injection and the subsequent requests to the web shell.
analyst@ubuntu:/mnt/moveit/logs$ grep -hoE '(moveitisapi\.dll|guestaccess\.aspx|human2\.aspx)' u_ex23*.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn 1284 moveitisapi.dll 407 guestaccess.aspx 126 human2.aspx # 126 requests to human2.aspx — the exfiltration stage
Figure 3 — Distribution of chain stages across IIS logs
Remediation and response
- Upgrade the product to the vendor's patched build.
- Remove unexpected files from the web root and temporary folders, preserving them as evidence first.
- Rotate credentials and API keys for every service account.
- Treat the server as breached with possible data loss, and handle regulatory notification separately.
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/mft$ curl -sk https://mft.lab.local/human.aspx | grep -oiE 'MOVEit Transfer[^<]{0,20}' && curl -sk -o /dev/null -w 'human2: %{http_code}\n' https://mft.lab.local/human2.aspx MOVEit Transfer 2023.0.4 human2: 404 # patched build, web shell artefact removed
Figure 4 — Verification after upgrade and clean-up
Conclusion
The MOVEit campaign proved that a single vendor product can affect hundreds of organisations at once. Data-heavy systems such as file transfer platforms sit in their own risk class — internet-facing and full of partner data — and their patch windows should be planned at critical infrastructure level.
Sources
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