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Home / Blog / CVE-2023-34362
Threat Research

MOVEit Transfer: From SQL Injection to Mass Data Theft

Summary

MOVEit Transfer is a managed file transfer (MFT) product organisations use to exchange files with partners. CVE-2023-34362 is an unauthenticated SQL injection in its web interface.

The injection was chained into the product's own object loading path to drop a web shell named human2.aspx on the server. That chain became the foundation of a 2023 extortion campaign that stole data from hundreds of organisations.

Method note

No exploitation payload is published here; the focus is exposure detection, artefact hunting and remediation.

Advisory details

CVECVE-2023-34362
ComponentProgress MOVEit Transfer — web interface
ClassCWE-89 · SQL injection leading to remote code execution
SeverityCRITICAL · CVSS 9.8
Affected versions2021.0.x, 2021.1.x, 2022.0.x, 2022.1.x, 2023.0.x (builds before May 2023)
PrerequisiteNone — an internet-facing web interface is enough

Root cause: trusted input and a powerful database account

The first link in the chain is user input reaching a SQL statement unsanitised. The second is the breadth of the database account's privileges, combined with the application processing data read back from the database without sufficient validation.

Together they turn what should have been a read-only injection into the ability to write files on the server.

Exposure and version check

analyst@ubuntu: ~/labs/mft –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/mft$ curl -sk https://mft.lab.local/human.aspx | grep -oiE 'MOVEit (Transfer|DMZ)[^<]{0,20}'
MOVEit Transfer 2023.0.0

#  a build from before May 2023 — affected range

Figure 1 — Reading the product version from the login page

For internet-facing MFT servers the second question is whether the admin interface and API endpoints need to be exposed at all.

Artefact hunting

The campaign's clearest trace is the human2.aspx file dropped into the web root, together with temporary DLLs.

analyst@ubuntu: /mnt/moveit –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:/mnt/moveit$ find wwwroot -maxdepth 1 -newermt '2023-05-25' -printf '%TY-%Tm-%Td %10s %p\n' | sort
2023-05-28      3421 wwwroot/human2.aspx
2023-05-28     11776 wwwroot/App_Data/_tmp7f3a.dll
2023-05-31      97344 wwwroot/human.aspx

#  human2.aspx = the known web shell artefact

Figure 2 — Searching the web root for unexpected files

IIS logs reveal the order of the injection and the subsequent requests to the web shell.

analyst@ubuntu: /mnt/moveit/logs –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:/mnt/moveit/logs$ grep -hoE '(moveitisapi\.dll|guestaccess\.aspx|human2\.aspx)' u_ex23*.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
   1284 moveitisapi.dll
    407 guestaccess.aspx
    126 human2.aspx

#  126 requests to human2.aspx — the exfiltration stage

Figure 3 — Distribution of chain stages across IIS logs

Remediation and response

  1. Upgrade the product to the vendor's patched build.
  2. Remove unexpected files from the web root and temporary folders, preserving them as evidence first.
  3. Rotate credentials and API keys for every service account.
  4. Treat the server as breached with possible data loss, and handle regulatory notification separately.
analyst@ubuntu: ~/labs/mft –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/mft$ curl -sk https://mft.lab.local/human.aspx | grep -oiE 'MOVEit Transfer[^<]{0,20}' && curl -sk -o /dev/null -w 'human2: %{http_code}\n' https://mft.lab.local/human2.aspx
MOVEit Transfer 2023.0.4
human2: 404

#  patched build, web shell artefact removed

Figure 4 — Verification after upgrade and clean-up

Conclusion

The MOVEit campaign proved that a single vendor product can affect hundreds of organisations at once. Data-heavy systems such as file transfer platforms sit in their own risk class — internet-facing and full of partner data — and their patch windows should be planned at critical infrastructure level.

Sources

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