Summary
CVE-2023-22515 exists because the internal flag that records whether setup is complete can be written from outside. A single parameter added to a request flips Confluence back into “setup not finished” mode.
In that mode the setup wizard's administrator creation step becomes reachable again, and the attacker simply creates an admin account for themselves. The result is access to all corporate documentation — which, in most organisations, includes embedded credentials.
Advisory details
Root cause: writing to internal state from outside
The application stores setup completion in a configuration object. Because request parameters are bound onto object properties and this field was writable, an external parameter changes the application's security state.
We saw the same pattern in Spring4Shell: data binding becomes an authorisation boundary the moment it is not confined to business data.
Exposure check that creates no account
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/confluence$ curl -s http://conf.lab.local/rest/applinks/1.0/manifest | grep -oE '<version>[0-9.]+' | head -n 1 <version>8.5.1 # below 8.5.2 — affected version
Figure 1 — Version detection through the manifest
Exposure is probed without creating an administrator: the parameter that flips the setup flag is appended to a read-only page and the status code is observed.
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/confluence$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'status: %{http_code}\n' 'http://conf.lab.local/server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=false' status: 200 # a patched release returns 302/403 # 200 = the setup flag can be flipped from outside
Figure 2 — Checking exposure without creating an account
Log and account hunting
On exploited instances there are two traces to look for: requests to the setup endpoints, and administrator accounts nobody recognises.
analyst@ubuntu:/var/atlassian/logs$ grep -hoE '(setupadministrator|bootstrapStatusProvider)[^ "]*' *access*.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -n 3 26 bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=false 11 setupadministrator.action # the setup wizard was triggered from outside
Figure 3 — Counting requests to the setup endpoints
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/confluence$ psql -U confluence -c "SELECT user_name, created_date FROM cwd_user ORDER BY created_date DESC LIMIT 3;" user_name | created_date ------------+--------------------- svc-backup | 2023-10-04 02:14:51 mert | 2023-06-11 09:02:10 admin | 2022-01-18 14:40:03 # an unknown admin account created at 02:14
Figure 4 — Reviewing the most recently created accounts
Remediation
- Upgrade Confluence to 8.5.2 or later.
- Disable unexpected administrator accounts and hand their creation times to incident response.
- Terminate all administrator sessions and reset their passwords.
- Rotate any credentials stored in pages — documentation is full of them.
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/confluence$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'status: %{http_code}\n' 'http://conf.lab.local/server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=false' status: 302 # the parameter is ignored, the request is redirected to login
Figure 5 — Re-running the check after the upgrade
Conclusion
Internal platforms like Confluence are usually treated as “internal, limited access” — yet most installations are exposed for remote work and hold everything from passwords to architecture diagrams. They deserve first-class treatment in patching and monitoring, exactly like any other internet-facing application.
Sources
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