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Home / Blog / CVE-2023-22515
Vulnerability Analysis

Confluence: Reopening the Setup Wizard to Become an Administrator

Summary

CVE-2023-22515 exists because the internal flag that records whether setup is complete can be written from outside. A single parameter added to a request flips Confluence back into “setup not finished” mode.

In that mode the setup wizard's administrator creation step becomes reachable again, and the attacker simply creates an admin account for themselves. The result is access to all corporate documentation — which, in most organisations, includes embedded credentials.

Advisory details

CVECVE-2023-22515
ComponentAtlassian Confluence Data Center / Server — setup state handling
ClassCWE-285 · Broken access control
SeverityCRITICAL · CVSS 10.0
Affected versionsData Center and Server releases 8.0.0 – 8.5.1
PrerequisiteNone — no authentication required
NoteConfluence Cloud is not affected

Root cause: writing to internal state from outside

The application stores setup completion in a configuration object. Because request parameters are bound onto object properties and this field was writable, an external parameter changes the application's security state.

We saw the same pattern in Spring4Shell: data binding becomes an authorisation boundary the moment it is not confined to business data.

Exposure check that creates no account

analyst@ubuntu: ~/labs/confluence –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/confluence$ curl -s http://conf.lab.local/rest/applinks/1.0/manifest | grep -oE '<version>[0-9.]+' | head -n 1
<version>8.5.1

#  below 8.5.2 — affected version

Figure 1 — Version detection through the manifest

Exposure is probed without creating an administrator: the parameter that flips the setup flag is appended to a read-only page and the status code is observed.

analyst@ubuntu: ~/labs/confluence –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/confluence$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'status: %{http_code}\n' 'http://conf.lab.local/server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=false'
status: 200

#  a patched release returns 302/403
#  200 = the setup flag can be flipped from outside

Figure 2 — Checking exposure without creating an account

Log and account hunting

On exploited instances there are two traces to look for: requests to the setup endpoints, and administrator accounts nobody recognises.

analyst@ubuntu: /var/atlassian/logs –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:/var/atlassian/logs$ grep -hoE '(setupadministrator|bootstrapStatusProvider)[^ "]*' *access*.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -n 3
     26 bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=false
     11 setupadministrator.action

#  the setup wizard was triggered from outside

Figure 3 — Counting requests to the setup endpoints

analyst@ubuntu: ~/labs/confluence –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/confluence$ psql -U confluence -c "SELECT user_name, created_date FROM cwd_user ORDER BY created_date DESC LIMIT 3;"
 user_name  |     created_date
------------+---------------------
 svc-backup | 2023-10-04 02:14:51
 mert       | 2023-06-11 09:02:10
 admin      | 2022-01-18 14:40:03

#  an unknown admin account created at 02:14

Figure 4 — Reviewing the most recently created accounts

Remediation

  1. Upgrade Confluence to 8.5.2 or later.
  2. Disable unexpected administrator accounts and hand their creation times to incident response.
  3. Terminate all administrator sessions and reset their passwords.
  4. Rotate any credentials stored in pages — documentation is full of them.
analyst@ubuntu: ~/labs/confluence –□✕
analyst@ubuntu:~/labs/confluence$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'status: %{http_code}\n' 'http://conf.lab.local/server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=false'
status: 302

#  the parameter is ignored, the request is redirected to login

Figure 5 — Re-running the check after the upgrade

Conclusion

Internal platforms like Confluence are usually treated as “internal, limited access” — yet most installations are exposed for remote work and hold everything from passwords to architecture diagrams. They deserve first-class treatment in patching and monitoring, exactly like any other internet-facing application.

Sources

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